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At the borders of medical reasoning: aetiological
and ontological challenges of medically
unexplained symptoms
Thor Eirik Eriksen1, Roger Kerry2,3*, Stephen Mumford3,4, Svein Anders Noer Lie5 and Rani Lill Anjum4
Abstract
Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) remain recalcitrant to the medical profession, proving less suitable for
homogenic treatment with respect to their aetiology, taxonomy and diagnosis. While the majority of existing
medical research methods are designed for large scale population data and sufficiently homogenous groups, MUS
are characterised by their heterogenic and complex nature. As a result, MUS seem to resist medical scrutiny in a
way that other conditions do not. This paper approaches the problem of MUS from a philosophical point of view.
The aim is to first consider the epistemological problem of MUS in a wider ontological and phenomenological
context, particularly in relation to causation. Second, the paper links current medical practice to certain ontological
assumptions. Finally, the outlines of an alternative ontology of causation are offered which place characteristic
features of MUS, such as genuine complexity, context-sensitivity, holism and medical uniqueness at the centre of
any causal set-up, and not only for MUS. This alternative ontology provides a framework in which to better
understand complex medical conditions in relation to both their nature and their associated research activity.
Keywords: Medically unexplained symptoms, Causation, Epistemology, Phenomenology, Ontology, Philosophy,
Dispositions
Introduction
Medical professionals and the medical research commu-
nity are faced with comprehensive challenges relating
to what are termed medically unexplained symptoms
(MUS). The medical professional is presented with di-
verse and disjointed symptoms and one strategy (among
others) aims at translating these into meaningful diag-
nostic entities. However, the expected patterns or clus-
tering of symptoms frequently do not fit any known or
common classification. We are here referring to possible
medical conditions which to a certain extent are consid-
ered to be resistant to explanation. Which conditions
qualify as medically unexplained is itself a subject of
controversy, but some that have been commonly labelled
as such are chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), irritable
bowel syndrome (IBS), low back pain (LBP) and fibro-
myalgia (FM). In what follows we prefer to apply the
most common term MUS, which here refers to a de-
cisive characteristic; absence of explanatory pathology.
MUS represent a major challenge facing public health-
care in European and other industrialised countries. The
US National Institute of Health (NIH) identifies MUS as
the most common problem in medicine [1]. Given the
unexplained character of these conditions, together with
the diversity of diagnostic designations and definitions,
estimates of prevalence and costs necessarily become ad-
vanced guesswork. Nevertheless, the numbers available
give us a clear indication that such conditions are com-
mon and represent a significant cost to society. The UK
Forum for Mental Health in Primary Care estimates that
the national annual healthcare costs of MUS exceed £3.1
billion (of a total of £18 billion) [2]. MUS are linked to a
20-50% increase in outpatient costs and a 30% increase
in hospitalisation (ibid.). Health authorities in England,
such as the NHS confederation’s Mental Health Net-
work, estimates that up to 20% of new primary care GP
appointments concern MUS. In 2007 5% of Canadians
(1.2 million people) suffered from MUS, including
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multiple chemical sensitivity, fibromyalgia and chronic
pain [3]. In primary care practice in Germany MUS rep-
resented 66% of all reported symptoms with the highest
rates among women, younger persons, and non-native
speakers [4].
The problem of MUS could be interpreted as an em-
pirical matter, to be solved by the medical field doing
more of the same work using the same methods they
apply to other diseases. On this view, more observation
data, randomised controlled trials (RCTs), symptom
counts and classification could ultimately lead to a
clearer understanding of these conditions. Alternatively,
it is suggested by some that MUS show the limitations
of evidence based medicine [5-7]. This would mean that
the problem of MUS is a symptom of deeper, underlying
philosophical issues that need to be resolved. Addressing
the medically unexplained as a philosophical challenge,
this paper approaches the phenomena of MUS both
from an epistemological and an ontological perspective.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we show
how MUS is an epistemological problem for the medical
community, involving aetiological and classificatory chal-
lenges. After this we take a step back and ask what this
phenomenon that we are struggling to explain actually
is: what is the matter, so to speak, or “den Sachen
selbst”? The final sections of the paper are similarly
motivated by the idea that the problem of MUS is linked
to deeper ontological and conceptual issues. We end by
offering the outlines of an alternative ontology which we
argue would provide a better foundation for understand-
ing characteristic features of MUS such as multifactorial
aetiology, heterogeneity and medical uniqueness. Argu-
ably, these are features that are present in all causal
setups and in all medical conditions, although perhaps
not to the same degree as in MUS. With this alternative
ontology, therefore, we might be able to throw some
new light also on other medical conditions, such as can-
cer or heart disease. This will not be further addressed
in this paper, however.
Medically unexplained symptoms as an epistemological
problem
The problem of MUS is linked to a lack of causal expla-
nations, applicable and meaningful diagnostic descrip-
tions and specifically targeted interventions addressing
such conditions. This problem can be further articulated
in different ways:
– the bio-physical causes of the symptoms, or different
factors in the development of the disorder, are
unknown;
– some of the supposed factors involved in the
development of the disorder are known, but the
underlying mechanisms are not understood;
– no adequate psychological or organic pathology can
be found.
– the symptoms remain undiagnosed after medical
examination.
A review of the comprehensive literature concerning
MUS reveals a general expectation that symptoms and
their underlying conditions can ultimately be given some
kind of explanation, if there were enough research
undertaken. This means that the label “unexplained” only
indicates that the causal mechanisms are temporarily
hidden and undetected. Symptomatic of this view is
Vandvik’s [8] comment on IBS: “While we are waiting for
a possible explanation for this and numerous other enig-
matic conditions” [p. 661, our translation]. Similarly,
Yunus [9] discusses the “meta-diagnosis” of central sensi-
tivity syndromes (CSS) and an appurtenant “lower-level”
diagnosis such as chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS)
suggesting that: “A variety of abnormal neuroendocrine,
immunological, and brain functions have been demon-
strated in CFS, but their causal relationship with fatigue
remains to be determined” [p. 344]. From the medical per-
spective the prima facie problem of MUS is thus an epis-
temological one, concerning our incomplete knowledge.
There are a number of characteristic features of MUS
that make them particularly difficult to handle scientific-
ally. In the following we will present some of these aspects.
No single and simple cause
No common cause or set of causes can be found for any
of these symptoms. Rather, there seems to be a whole
range of both symptoms and causes, none of which offer
a clear-cut one-to-one relation between cause and effect.
As noted by Voigt et al. [10] “patients with MUS do not
appear to have monocausal simplistic somatic explana-
tions for their complaints” (p. 408). Several studies show
that patients have multiple explanatory models that are
used for grasping the complexity of their own condi-
tions. Such models cover the whole spectrum from
physical, psychological, social and existential explana-
tions, neither of them being necessarily dominant [11].
Studies of so-called Somatoform Disorder (SD) (an-
other so-called meta-diagnosis) seem to support this. A
study by Hiller et al. [12] showed that the symptom
presentation of SD is heterogeneous and therefore con-
tributes to comprehensive complexity. On this evidence
they conclude that “the clinical attribution of ambiguous
symptoms to a single and simple cause is questionable
and not consistent with our current state of knowledge”
[p. 10]. Another example of complex and unclear aeti-
ology is low back pain (LBP). Different types of low back
pain have been identified and different taxonomies are
used to describe type. For example LBP is commonly
described as acute or chronic based on the period of
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time a person has experienced pain. Alternatively, type
has been described as specific or non-specific. Non-
specific LBP (NSLBP) is of significant concern to health
care science due to its complexity and high prevalence.
Lifetime prevalence has been reported at up to 84%
representing significant costs to society [13]. By definition,
NSLBP is not attributable to a known specific cause [14].
Evidence regarding its progression and intervention-
response is grounded in uncertainty. Uncertainty regard-
ing all aspects of NSLBP can be accounted for by its
seemingly inherent complex nature. However, the per-
sistence of this uncertainty seems at odds with the vast
amount of scientific research focussed on the phenom-
ena over several decades. With reference to its aetiology,
a brief review of epidemiological science exposes the
limits of knowledge of causal responsibility. NSLBP is
traditionally thought to be causally related to mechanical
stresses on the body created through, for example, pos-
ture and lifting which may induce aberrant muscle re-
sponses and subsequent pain experiences. However,
mechanical factors including lifting, standing, walking,
occupational postures, bending, twisting, carrying, and
manual handling have been reported as non-causative
through systematic epidemiological study [15-20].
Varying degrees of statistical associations have been
reported between NSLBP and activity levels, obesity and
de-conditioning, but none of these variables can be con-
sidered causal [21,22]. The same can be said for factors
such as smoking, mood, and hypothesised genetic factors,
such as Interleukin-1 gene cluster polymorphisms [23-30].
Structural changes identifiable on imaging have also
been considered as causal factors but although some
studies demonstrate significant associations between
pain and lumbar disc degeneration and disc-space
narrowing [31,32], meta-analyses do not support causal
claims [33]. Further pathophysiological factors associated
with tissue structure and pain mediation, for example
nerve growth factor and tumour necrosis factor α, are
also weak causal agents [34,35].
In sum, the epidemiological failure to identify causal
factors confidently informs the definition and nomencla-
ture of NSLBP, as well as the categorisation of NSLBP as
a MUS. It is apparent that NSLBP is a complex
phenomenon; further, given the variation of epidemio-
logical responses in different studies and different
sub-groups, NSLBP can be considered as highly context-
sensitive in terms of any potential causal factor.
High proportions of the population experience NSLBP
and associate it with a cause – e.g. bending or lifting.
Equally, clinicians listening to and assessing people with
NSLBP find it difficult to disassociate the effect from
some cause [36,37]. A patient may state, for example,
that they bent to lift something and felt a sudden onset
of back pain, and since that event they have had back
pain. There is a deep intuition here for both the patient
and the clinician to consider the lifting event as causal
to the pain. Yet this is far from being supported from
epidemiological studies. Epidemiologically and aetiolo-
gically, NSLBP does not have a cause. In each single case
however, it clearly does.
Epidemiology seems to deal well with other complex no-
tions, e.g. hypertension. NSLBP acts however as a more
sensitive measure of the scientific limitations of population
based methodologies than, say, hypertension. This is not
to say that population studies in themselves are limited. It
is clear that a massive amount of causal knowledge of
health processes has been derived from such studies. So
the limitation seems to have something to do with notions
outside of the methodologies themselves.
No single and simple theoretical model
The problem of finding a single cause or set of causes
for MUS has led to a revision of the presumed causal
understanding, a revision which stresses that the
aetiological character of unexplained conditions is multi-
factorial. That is, the causal patterns involved should in-
clude biological, psychological and social factors. The
theoretical framework suited for such a complexity is
the popular bio-psychosocial model of medicine which
was developed as a response to George L. Engel’s
pioneering article from 1977 [38], “The need for a new
medical model: a challenge for biomedicine”, heavily in-
spired by general systems theory: a model that insists on
the creation of broad-spectrum factorising. Instead of
limiting the medical model to specific biological factors
(the biomedical model) one has also to include the psy-
che and the individual in the society: both being dimen-
sions of the human entity that one presumes could be
divided into separate elements.
Based on this model, the conditions which are referred
to as unexplained somehow rest on a) biological compo-
nents such as genes, physiological reactivity, immune
responses, b) psychological factors such as coping pat-
terns, personality traits, health-related habits, cognition
and c) social factors such as social support from family,
social and cultural beliefs. However, advocates of Engel’s
model, such as Alvarez et al. [39], are sceptical of such
an idealised separation of components. They emphasise
that the bio-psychosocial model should not at all be
interpreted as a theory, a philosophy or a clinical
method holding such ideas. Instead they insist that
Engel’s approach involved a “humanist look at the pa-
tient, and it is not possible to design models that show cli-
nicians how to make clinical decisions in every single case:
this concerns essentially something really inherent in the
human being: individuality and subjectivity” [p. 179].
Thus, in agreement with Alvarez et al., we find that it
is not self-evident that those issues, themes, phenomena
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or matters involved in MUS allow such factorising and
separating initiatives (cf. a-c above). Furthermore, we
could suggest that this implicit and unarticulated premise
in itself represents one of the main problems for future
medical research. Such claims naturally draw us into the
prolonged discussion concerning reductionism. Reduc-
tionism is the idea that every phenomenon or process can
at least in principle be explained or derived from relatively
lower level phenomena or processes. This means that
causation typically travels bottom up, from micro to
macro level. Social phenomena have psychological causes
which again can be explained biologically, biochemically,
and so on. Reductionism thus promotes a derivative rela-
tionship between wholes and their parts, where the nature
and behaviour of the whole complex phenomenon is en-
tirely determined by its constituent parts.
Dealing with medically unexplained symptoms, Butler
et al. [40] presents in this respect a typical criticism of
medicine, referring to the eagerness “to break down
complex phenomena in the hope of finding meaning in
the simpler constituents (reductionism)” [p. 219]. They
add: “Even though the biopsychosocial model empha-
sizes the importance of understanding the patient’s
experience, the philosophical basis is essentially mechan-
istic” [ibid.]. A more radical departure from reduction-
ism seems necessary for dealing with the genuine
aetiological complexity of MUS.
No clear psyche-soma division
There remains an even deeper challenge here, which is
frequently addressed in the MUS literature, namely the
assumption of the psyche-soma division. In the branches
of medicine and psychiatry and to a certain extent even
in psychology, one upholds the notion of this functional
organisation. That is, one presupposes the possibility of
separating and attributing the explaining factors to re-
spectively psyche and soma. By this guiding one is left
with different interpretative alternatives: 1) the physical
symptoms must be understood as secondary to psycho-
logical processes (it is “all in the head”), or; 2) the phys-
ical symptoms are primary (that is, “real symptoms”).
This unfortunate division is not restricted to the classical
biomedical model. Butler et al. [40] argues that even the
bio-psychosocial model − which is assumed to integrate
the patient’s subjective experiences − also presupposes a
mind-body dualism. Such dualism has been challenged
by a number of researchers on MUS, but perhaps far
more crucial is it that the conditions themselves, such as
CFS, seem to resist a clear-cut mind-body division [6].
By separating psychological from somatic mechanisms,
the endocrine system from the immunological system,
gastrointestinal symptoms from musculoskeletal symp-
toms, cognitive from social aspects, influence of man-
agement from quantitative demands at work, and so on,
one assumes that the full picture eventually will emerge.
That is, one expects that the nexus of critical mecha-
nisms, causal factors and diverse systems together will
create a comprehensible totality. This does not necessar-
ily follow, however.
While the original intention was to have a model that
would be better suited to deal with the patient as a unity,
one seems stuck within an ontological framework where
the world consists of independent mereological parts
without any genuine interaction or emergence. As
already mentioned, this fits well with the idea of reduc-
tionism, to which the bio-psychosocial model was
intended as a better alternative. In this context, it seems
natural to bring in the well-known allegory of the blind
men and the elephant [41]. Each of the blind men were
introduced to various parts of an elephant and subse-
quently asked to describe the character of the animal.
Their interpretations differed widely, depending on
which part they were investigating. The man studying
the foot “saw” a tree, while the one studying the trunk
“saw” a snake. We can consider the numerous sugges-
tions for explanatory models, hypotheses and conceptual
constructions of the medically unexplained in a similar
vein. The gastro-medical specialist “sees” the unex-
plained irritable bowel. The physical-medical specialist
has an eye for the inexplicably painful lumbar region.
The psychiatrist “sees” an unexplained mental disorder.
In a benevolent perspective we may imagine that the
numerous fragments all form part of a scientifically
ordered mosaic, which through continued painstaking
research and modelling finally may turn into the “true
and complete picture” of the phenomenon. In the case
of the blind men and the elephant, however, no such
coherent picture emerged.
No clear-cut classification
So far we have been dealing with the aetiological prob-
lem of MUS, which is related to the genuine complexity
of these conditions. Now we enter a perhaps deeper
problem concerning the classification of MUS. In the
beginning of this paper we mentioned a number of well-
known diagnoses that are often classified as medically
unexplained: CFS, LBP, FM, IBS and GAD. But the
clear-cut classification and diagnosis is apparent only.
Since the symptoms of MUS are typically extremely
complex, ambiguous and to a large degree overlapping,
none of the conditions are easily classified.
One aspect of this challenge concerns the problematic
continuum aspect. By introducing the continuum one
realises and acknowledges that complaints, symptoms,
affliction or distress to a large extent are dimensional
phenomena. That is, they can be located somewhere on
a time- and severity continuum. The real challenge is to
decide exactly where on this scale the complaints of the
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patient belong: early phase or close to an endpoint, mild
or severe condition, acute or chronic symptoms. One
has primarily acknowledged these issues in the face of
mental illness and especially when trying to diagnose
anxiety and depression. Realising that milder forms of
such psychiatric conditions are frequently involved in
MUS, it is easy to understand the dilemmas medical
professionals are confronted when facing patients with
such multi-symptomatic conditions. In view of the ser-
iousness of this challenge, Musalek and Scheibenbogen
[42] note that “The problem of inhomogeneous categor-
ies and the difficulty of drawing boundaries as well as
individual progression of psycho-pathologic phenomena,
necessitates a change of paradigm from categorical to
dimensional diagnostics” [p. 18].
Accepting such complexity with respect to symptoms,
one is seemingly faced with entangled chaos. A number
of possible strategies are available to overcome the prob-
lem. These strategies can be divided into two categories
marked by so-called lumpers and splitters. The lumpers
take the very similar symptom pictures to indicate that
“something” is in common and that all functional som-
atic syndromes are manifestations of a single syndrome
[[43] p. 213]. The wide range of higher-level “meta-diag-
noses” is the clearest example of this strategy: bodily dis-
tress disorder (BDD) [44], central sensitivity syndrome
(CSS) [9], subjective health complaints (SHC) [45], func-
tional somatic syndromes (FSS) [46] and somatoform
disorder (SD). In contrast to this, the splitters hold that
that the diversity of the conditions show that they are in
fact different or unique: “comparable with many diseases
with a known pathogenic origin, the symptoms, several
non-symptom characteristics, and interventions of som-
atic syndromes show considerable overlap, but this is in
itself insufficient reason to give up separate classifica-
tions” [ibid.]. In this disordered landscape, every medical
speciality manages its own segment of unexplained
special conditions. In a branch such as Occupational
and Environmental Medicine one can come across
conditions such as sick building syndrome (SBS),
multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) and Electromagnetic
Hypersensitivity.
The various diagnoses regarding MUS cannot be
regarded as scientifically neutral tools. A number of the
diagnoses involve clear aetiological assumptions. This is
for instance the case for a diagnosis such as CSS for
which Yunus [9] ascribes the following mechanisms: “the
CSS concept …is based on mutual associations among
the members with overlapping clinical features and are
bound by a common pathophysiological glue of central
sensitization (CS)” [p. 340]. He emphasises that all labels
such as functional somatic syndromes, somatisation
disorders, psychosomatic syndromes and medically unex-
plained symptoms actually share a feature; the appearing
symptoms are governed by a process of sensitisation.
The sensitivity itself is considered to be the clinical
manifestation of this process. This sort of theory accom-
modates considerable aetiological implications which are
also considered as extremely problematic. Dealing with
the endlessly disputed issue of the psyche-soma division
from the outset of psychiatric diagnoses, such as conver-
sion disorder and somatisation disorder, Thomas [47]
remarks that: “the DSM definitions of conversion/
somatization do not provide anything resembling an
operational definition for either one. Without this kind
of operational definition, there can be no research cap-
able of establishing causal relationships. In other words,
the diagnoses of conversion/somatization have never
been validated. The whole argument for causality and in-
deed the diagnosis of conversion/somatization itself is
built on quicksand” [p. 544].
From a critical perspective, we find the higher-level
diagnoses unhelpful. The object of study seems to with-
draw and the creation of new acronyms could lead to
increased confusion rather than clarification. Instead, the
widespread use of notions such as syndrome, unex-
plained, distress, sensitivity and subjectivity suggests that
something in the human nature resists prevailing scien-
tific treatment.
No common experience
We have seen that existing scientific methods and models
fall short in our attempt to understand the medically unex-
plained conditions. Vast aetiological complexity and lack of
clear taxonomy have been presented as scientific chal-
lenges. But there is perhaps deeper a problem which relates
directly to the shortcomings of existing scientific methods.
This is the feature of the medically unexplained symptoms
that we refer to as medical uniqueness. Each MUS patient
seems to have both a unique combination of symptoms
and a unique expression of the condition. They are, so to
speak, diseased in their own way. Confronted by such a
challenge one might wonder whether we should continue
this search for the true causal nexus of the unexplained, or
whether we are wasting our time on an impossible task.
Although we can trace fragmented evidence in the
form of assumed true aetiological factors, we are still left
with an incomprehensible and enigmatic “entity” – the
suffering human being in its environment. Due to the
absence of aetiological clarity, Malterud [48] suggests
that when we are confronted with an unexplained com-
plaint such as low back pain we should rethink our strat-
egies: “We can understand muscle-pain in the light of
the interaction between body, soul and life conditions. It
is not so much to gain by searching for simple explana-
tions and unambiguous findings. Instead we should en-
courage coping and contribute to a dissolving of those
vicious circles maintaining the symptoms” [p. 2356].
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At this point it should be obvious that this field repre-
sents a challenge that accommodates almost insur-
mountable aetiological and related obstacles. A brief and
extremely simplified review of these reveals several
issues that call for further investigation. Although the
presentation above in no way relates to a homogenous
and clearly defined discourse, what the various contribu-
tions have in common is that they all somehow address
the multifarious landscape of unexplained illness.
Altogether, these different attempts to deal with the
medically unexplained reveal a certain degree of bewil-
derment. This is a problem that neither discredits the
medical discipline, nor implies that medical researchers
should refrain from further investigations into unex-
plained matters. However, it possibly indicates that
medicine somehow has reached a limit. Thus Deary [5]
suggests that MUS are the limit cases of medicine and
that they may remain unexplained as long as we main-
tain the old ontology. Taking this as our starting point
for a philosophical reflection, we will now explore the
medically unexplained from a phenomenological (exist-
ential) perspective.
The phenomenon of the medically unexplained
The search for a causal explanation of medically unex-
plained illnesses has involved a clear focus on why. In
spite of our access to highly advanced scientific methods,
how can it be that those mentioned conditions are still
unexplained – or at least unclarified? Our preliminary
answers may be disturbing. We suggest that MUS and
our struggle to understand them indicate that one might
have reached the borders of prevailing medical reason-
ing. That is, medicine is confronted by its limit cases. Such
“cases” or matters reside from the very beginning outside
or beyond the prevailing medical scientific catchments
area. If this is a problem that concerns a disease matter,
then to search for an answer only to the question of why is
insufficient. We must therefore return to the basic ques-
tions concerning interrogatives such as what and how,
asking ourselves; what are, really, the matters involved
concerning the so-called MUS? How do they “appear” or
“reside” in the life of humans? Such questions are crucial
in an exploration of the ontological foundations of any
health related matters involving human beings.
An initial response to such questions − from a phe-
nomenological and existential perspective − indicates
that we may be facing complex, but also simple and
common, human phenomena. Despite the difficulties
concerning deciphering and understanding such phe-
nomena, they somehow relate to the non-complicated
sphere of everyday life. Our struggle for linguistic con-
trol of such phenomena, with the help of advanced med-
ical terminology, necessarily gets out of hand and the
result is a messy world of acronyms. All disease are
intertwined with the “the human condition” and the
MUS-acronyms seem to be only blind gestures to the
world that we as human beings are living in. To say that
it is unexplained is a category mistake.
Suggesting that the object of study may not be a bio-
medically or a bio-psychosocially constituted entity, our
approach relates to that of the anthropologist Gilles
Bibeau [49]. His worry is that questions such as “What is
human in humans?” and “What is the nature of human
nature?” to a large extent will be answered by geneticists,
neurologists, artificial intelligence researchers, techno-
scientists and owners of biotech companies [p. 355]. In
contrast, he notes, the lives of humans involve and are
shaped by history, language, meaning, symbolic systems,
experience, consciousness and emotions that together
form a unity that only to a very limited extent can be ra-
tionally explained or described by science [ibid]. These are
dimensions representing foreign “objects” in a medicalised
and technified world.
Thus, humans qua humans exist in − or face − the “ex-
ternal” world on a level that is specifically human. The dif-
ficulty with the human level is that there is no agreement
on what humans are, or whether we can even describe
humans by referring to human properties. This however
does not imply that human diseases should be treated and
explained on a lower level, even though many symptoms
are expressed on a lower level. Instead, we need to keep
our attention on the level at which humans live their lives.
The appropriate level for describing human experience
and phenomena, we argue, is from a phenomenological
perspective; humans qua humans.
From such a phenomenological perspective, as humans
we do not simply have a sickness; we also have an ad-
vanced capability of interpretation. We relate to a sickness
in certain ways depending on how we interpret it. We do
not simply have the property of being male, strong, de-
pressed or eager. We also relate to those properties: we
are male, strong, depressed or eager in specific ways. And
it’s these ways that may be important when we want to ac-
cess the realm of how different MUS come about.
Addressing this subject further, Eriksen et al. [41] em-
phasise how predominant symptoms such as fatigue and
pain, together with certain biographical dimensions, dir-
ect us towards what we consider to be inescapable and
fundamental conditions in the life of the imbalanced and
distressed modern human being. Phenomena such as
Fatigued-Being and Painful-Being are dimensions of life
that are considered to be indelible, inevitable and to a
certain degree indispensable. Such phenomena could be
seen as elements in an aesthetics of resistance [ibid.].
Furthermore, they could be seen as encumbrances that
follow the destiny of being a living human being. These
are dimensions that are not easily reachable for
traditional explanatory advances. (For instance, this will
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forever be the case as regards the phenomenon we name
anxiety, which usually follows incomprehensible pain
conditions). At least they are not reachable within the
existing paradigm for explanation in medicine.
Following such a phenomenological (and ontological)
inspired trail of thoughts, it comes naturally to suggest
that questions concerning causation are not the only
crucial momentum involved. That is, one recognises that
the matters – den Sachen – are basic phenomena that
precede a second-order conception of an object, grasped
as some multifactorial “thing”. However, this lack of faith
in explanatory endeavours, organised by medical re-
search regarding unexplained matters, does not imply a
universal rejection of causal concerns as such. Rather, it
voices a doubt with regard to the factorising, dissection
or reduction that follows from efforts aimed at revealing
the mechanics involved. Matters such as fatigue, pain,
anxiety and melancholy resist such fragmentation, and
for this reason we should be open for research initiatives
that somehow accepts holism and at the same time is
able to problematise the basic elements of the medical
scientific paradigm. Consequently, there is a need for a
new initiative that carries explanatory potential, but
which is able to accommodate real world complexity.
As we continue to introduce such an initiative, we
search for a way to accept humans qua humans (and the
phenomenological descriptions given), while at the same
time trying to re-address the question of causality. The
aim is to get a better understanding of medically unex-
plained symptoms as “natural” (individual) reactions
(resistance), and also of how such reactions are instanti-
ated in processes taking place at lower levels.
Ontology revealed
We have seen that the problem of MUS is more than
just a question of finding the true causes of a disease.
Prima facie challenges are related to the complex nature
of these conditions with respect to causes, symptoms,
diagnosis and classification. MUS researchers have tried
to deal with this complexity by challenging mono-
causality, reductionism and dualism. The mechanistic
and biomedical model has been replaced with the bio-
psychosocial model, and one has attempted to re-classify
and re-organise the conditions. The aim is to find a way
to deal with features that are characteristic of MUS but
which many existing methods fail to embrace: multifac-
torial causation (complexity), extreme heterogeneity
(context-sensitivity), medical uniqueness (singularity)
and health and disease as belonging to the person as a
whole (anti-reductionism). Such issues touch upon our
deepest ontological assumptions and cannot be sepa-
rated from our scientific models, concepts or methods.
The existing ontology might not be one consistent
world-view. But from the practice of medicine we can
derive a number of ontological assumptions. The search
for biomedical causes and treatments of psychological
and social phenomena reveals a commitment to reduc-
tionism, for instance, and professional divisions of med-
ical specialisms suggest that the various parts and
dimensions of human health can be treated as relatively
separate and distinct processes. This fits well with an
ontology that takes wholes to be the sum of mereo-
logical parts which − although they are parts of the same
mechanisms − don’t have any genuine interaction.
Other ontological assumptions can be derived from
medical methods, such as the use of RCT and observa-
tion data. Kerry et al. [50] argue that these methods
make clear commitments to a notion of causation that is
tightly linked to robust correlations (regularity theory).
A basic assumption here is that same cause will give
same effect, or at least that similar cause will give similar
effect. This idea has recently been challenged [51]. A
further ontological assumption, that can be seen from
the use of population data, is a commitment to general
facts over particular or singular facts. This fits well with
the covering law ontology, according to which the particular
cases − being similar in all the causally relevant aspects −
can be logically derived from a general causal claim. In this
model, any context-sensitivity or individual differences are
ruled out either by definition or through idealisation. What
is left is some idealised or statistically average situation
which is supposed to apply to any individual case.
When we cannot find perfect correlations between in-
terventions and effect in the population data, we can make
probabilistic conclusions instead based on the statistical
findings. Such an inference reveals a frequentist commit-
ment to probability theory. This forces us to commit to
genuinely chancy situations where all we can say is that a
patient will have a certain probability of getting an effect
from the intervention, and where it is impossible to say
anything more about why some patients had an effect
while others didn’t. The frequentist theory contrasts with
propensity theory, which takes probability to be based in
individual propensities rather than on a given sequence of
events. One might then argue that one patient has a
higher propensity of getting an effect from the interven-
tion, based on what we know about their medical history,
diet, lifestyle, and so on. In contrast to a probabilistic in-
terpretation, one might want to argue that any result that
is less than perfect regularities come down to an all or
nothing situation, where predicting the effect of interven-
tion is just a matter of finding the right sub-group. If 3 of
10 patients had an effect, it might be that the larger part
of the patients had no chance of effect while three of them
had a chance of 1. We see here that the different ways to
interpret the statistical result give us different descriptions
of reality. These are the ontological and conceptual
assumptions that we bring to our methods and our data.
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Given the heterogeneity of MUS we can see how
population data will have little relevance. Individual vari-
ation is the rule rather than the exception, and similar
causes seem to give vastly different effect. Where one
person gets a chronic back pain from bending down or
lifting something, others bend and lift every day without
getting back pain.
We see that the old ontology cannot be replaced by
anything other than a new ontology. If we try to change
bits and pieces, there is a fair chance that assumptions
from the old ontology follow into our new approach to-
gether with our concepts, methods or models. What we
offer next is an ontology that challenges the old one in a
number of respects. While MUS seem to be the limit
cases of the old ontology, they are exemplary cases
within the new ontology.
Dispositionalism – an alternative ontology
The dispositional ontology is one that arguably best ac-
commodates the features we feel are needed for dealing
with MUS: singularism, complexity, holism, heterogen-
eity, scalarity and emergence. This ontology has its roots
in Aristotelian metaphysics but it has been appropriated
and modernised in recent decades by the likes of Harré
and Madden [52], Mumford [53], Molnar [54], Bird [55]
and Mumford and Anjum [51]. The core commitment is
to the reality of individual powers or dispositions. On
one version of this view all things behave the way they
do, not because of external laws, but because of their
own intrinsic properties [56].
Typical for dispositions is that they can exist unmani-
fested. A woman can be fertile without ever getting
pregnant and one can have a genetic predisposition for a
disease without ever developing it. Some call disposi-
tions causal powers. When a sugar cube dissolves, for in-
stance, it is because it has a real causal power of
solubility that is “released” when it meets the appropri-
ate mutual manifestation partner, water. Taken in isola-
tion, a disposition might not even do any causal work.
Only through interaction with other dispositions will a
causal process be initiated. Furthermore, a disposition
can contribute to bring about a number of effects. What
effect a disposition contributes to produce will therefore
depend on the causal context. Heat, for instance, can
causally produce a burn, boiling, steam, melting, explo-
sion, drought, fire, growth, health, death, and many
other effects, depending on the manifestation partners.
This model seems particularly apt for medical cases
and for cases of MUS in particular. A single causal factor
can have a vast number of possible manifestation part-
ners. Which effect it contributes to produce will depend
entirely on what context it appears in. A virus has the
power to cause an infection, but whether it will succeed
in doing so will depend on the other causal powers
involved. Some people have a better immune system, for
instance, but even this is entirely dependent on context:
in periods of stress we might have a weaker immune sys-
tem. Whether we are infected by a virus also depends on
the type of virus, its intensity, vaccines, genetic disposi-
tions, and so on. It should therefore be no surprise to us
that two people can have vastly different effects from
being exposed to a virus.
Causation is central in medicine, since its ultimate aim
is health promotion and disease prevention. Promotion
and prevention are both causal notions. On the disposi-
tionalist account, this means that while there is no guar-
antee of successful outcomes in health science, there can
be distinct and sometimes strong tendencies. We can try
to prevent disease by causally counteracting or interfer-
ing with it. Mumford and Anjum [51] distinguish be-
tween two types of causal interference: subtractive and
additive. The first strategy is to remove one or more of
the causes disposing towards the unwanted outcome;
the second is to add something that disposes away from
the outcome. An example of subtractive interference
would be when someone gives up smoking to counteract
hypertension, while taking beta-blockers is a case of
additive interference towards the same goal. In the latter
case the patients could in principle continue with their
unhealthy lifestyle, but in addition take a kind of anti-
dote to counteract an effect of that lifestyle.
We saw that the problem of MUS has been linked to
dualism and reductionism, where focus has been di-
rected towards the psyche-soma division, favoring simple
physiological causes over complex psychosocial ones.
The bio-psychosocial model suggests that health is re-
lated to more than just the physiological level and
should thus be treated as a more complex matter. But
how does this work in theory? A reductionist ontology
will take for granted that causation travels bottom up.
This means that it is assumed that it is possible to
causally counteract an outcome on a macro level by
interfering with a causal process on the micro level. Re-
ductionism is thus the idea that the causally efficacious
level is the micro-level. This is the ontological view of
neuropsychology, genetic determinism and sociobiology,
and it is one that is gaining popularity also outside the
realm of science.
Dispositionalism favours holism over reductionism.
Philosophical holism is the view that on each new higher
level there can be some causal autonomy. It might for
instance be argued that it does not even make sense to
ascribe choices, desires or any intentional properties to
genes or neurons, but only to agents. On this view
desires, intentions and preferences are properties that
belong to a higher level than physiology and biology.
While the subject of biology is the organism, the subject
of psychology is a person. The philosophically holist idea
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is that the whole is more than just the sum of its parts.
Holism is tightly linked to genuine emergence.
The bio-psychosocial model is not a genuinely holist
one, since it treats these dimensions as three separable
factors that make a contribution to the illness of an indi-
vidual. A plausible reason for this is that the medical
model is restricted by medical methods, such as RCTs,
where the factors that we test for are treated as if they
are discrete and separable. Dispositionalism acknowl-
edges, however, that causal powers interact in such a
way that all factors compose into what we could call a
resultant power of the individual overall. Such compos-
ition need not be simply linear. It is not as if we can just
add powers and get their sum. Most, if not all, causal
production seems to happen through nonlinear compos-
ition. This means that when the various manifestation
partners come together in the appropriate way, they will
start to interact, influence and change each other, produ-
cing something different from what each could have pro-
duced on their own. It could for instance be that what is
produced is a novel phenomenon with an entirely new
set of properties, none of which are found in its compo-
nents. Life, mind, society and justice might all be taken
as genuine emergent phenomena, which have causal
powers that are specific to their level. This form of
dispositionalism thus allows an emergentist perspective in
which neither the parts of a person, nor their causal pow-
ers, are treated as distinct, separable nor even retaining a
distinct identity in the whole. RCTs look for causal factors
(e.g. what causes health improvement) one at a time, but
according to our holist perspective, we cannot guarantee
that those factors will behave the same way in all contexts,
such as in different patient subjects with their different
and no doubt unique combination of qualities.
Some form of philosophical holism seems essential in
medicine, and especially for medically unexplained condi-
tions, which clearly do not only belong to any one particu-
lar part of a person but to persons as a whole, in their
environment. Such an idea is philosophically compelling.
We shouldn’t say that it is eyes that see, nor brains that
think, for instance. Seeing and thinking are capabilities of
whole persons. An isolated eye could do very little. Simi-
larly, we shouldn’t think of NSLBP as a property only of a
patients back, but that it is something belonging to the
whole person. And even then, we need not limit the illness
to just the confines of the person’s body. As described in
relation to the phenomenological perspective, the person
can include the whole worldview of the subject, including
the context within which they are situated. In that case,
treatment should also be at the level of the patient,
treating them as a whole instead of attempting to treat
one isolated part or function of their body.
Emergence is essential in this context, because it allows
for genuine complexity. To move from monocausality to
multifactorial causation does not in itself guarantee that
we take the complexity seriously. If our methods are
designed to treat each factor separately, the phenomenon
as a whole is lost even if we include many factors and add
them up. Complexity is a core idea of dispositionalism,
and this is particularly clear in causation. All actual effects
will be multifactorial. The flammability of a match is not
alone sufficient for it to light when struck. It will also re-
quire the presence of oxygen and reasonably arid condi-
tions. Given that all such factors contribute, and all such
may be hypersensitive in relation to what they manifest,
then the medical uniqueness of each patient starts to look
a credible possibility.
Understanding causal interaction is not only about
taking into account all the factors involved and how they
compose. It is also a question of magnitude or degree.
On dispositionalism causes and effects come in degrees.
They are not a matter of “all or nothing”. An open fire
has the causal power to warm a room to a high degree
whereas a light bulb has it to a small degree. And the ef-
fect, of a room being warm, is clearly something that
comes on a scale. Similarly, we shouldn’t just think of
patients as being ill or not, healthy or not. Symptoms as
well as causes come in degrees. Whether a person is ill
or not cannot be determined solely from the type of
symptoms, but must be considered in a wider context. A
small causal factor can be the contribution that tips a
causal situation over a threshold, for instance. What ef-
fect something will have, is thus entirely dependent on
what else is already there in the situation. If a situation
is already at a tipping point, it takes very little to get a
threshold effect. Flu, while painful enough for some-
one with a strong general health, is still fairly harm-
less, but it can kill an old person or someone with a
weak immune system. Another example is allergy,
where a single peanut can cause great harm for one
person while being perfectly fine and nutritious for
another. This shows the extreme context-sensitivity of
causation. Same cause can have vastly different out-
comes. The heterogeneity of MUS should therefore
not surprise us, at least not from a philosophical per-
spective. On the contrary: looking for one single fea-
ture that is correlated with a type of MUS appears to
be a hopeless oversimplification.
Any such medical uniqueness of the individual is likely
to be masked in the methods of RCTs, which deal with
statistical averages of sufficiently homogenous groups.
The problem is that it is possible that no one be average.
We mentioned earlier propensity theory which takes
probability to be a matter of individual propensities.
Dispositionalism favours such a theory, which means
that one would not be inclined to draw conclusions
about individual propensities solely from a certain statis-
tical distribution. What we need to establish instead is
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what powers are at work behind certain forms of disease,
both in the person and in the environment.
Conclusion
The heterogeneity of MUS becomes easier to deal with
from a dispositionalist perspective. The dispositions
ontology allows a revised reading of data from popula-
tion studies, as well as facilitating a meaningful appreci-
ation of cause related to single-instance cases. Returning
to data on NSLBP, all above quoted population studies
reported some statistical correlations, but nothing strong
enough to support causal claims, in an epidemiological
sense. Likewise, existing comparison studies do not ex-
pose causation between hypothesised factors and occur-
rence of pain. However, dispositionally, it is the few
cases in which an occurrence did happen that are most
revealing. The individual cases in which mechanical
stress did result in pain are informative about the causal
compounds of NSLBP.
Dispositionalism allows us to embrace the characteris-
tic features of MUS: causal complexity, individual var-
iety, context-sensitivity and real emergence. It also
allows for a more person centred medicine. Rather than
treating illness as a biochemical phenomenon belonging
to a part of the organism, it should be considered as a
more complex phenomenon that is a part of the human
being in a psychosocial context. Dispositionalism also re-
veals the importance of tailoring a treatment to the pa-
tient by looking at their total situation. Exposure to a
treatment can then make the situation worse rather than
better. Each patient will meet the treatment with a whole
set of causal factors from their lifestyle, diet, biology and
medical history. Since no two individuals are the same,
using the same treatment on two different individuals will
in effect be two different treatments. Epidemiological in-
variance becomes both an impossible and redundant quest
for MUS. Only by theoretical abstraction can we be
tempted to think that there exists some individual that fits
the norm of a statistical average. But a robust ontological
foundation to back up such a unity is absent.
On a dispositionalist ontology it should not be
expected that there is some average, normal or standard
way to express a disease, simply because this average,
norm or standard does not exist other than as a
methodological derivation and abstraction from a vast
amount of correlation-data. Limit cases are often the
clearest symptoms we get of something being fundamen-
tally wrong with the theoretical framework. So if we take
dispositionalism seriously, this is not something that is
specifically related to so-called MUS, but applies also to
illnesses that we typically take to be medically explained,
such as heart disease. The ontological framework
presented here suggests a different methodological
approach for dealing with MUS, namely one that favours
individually based investigation and treatment to statis-
tical and systematic approaches [50]. What we need,
then, is some new tools for dealing with causal singular-
ity, complexity, diversity and medical uniqueness.
We are not arguing that the dispositions ontology and
the dispositional theory of causation will help us solve
the problems of MUS. Instead we have offered a philo-
sophical framework that takes certain characteristic fea-
tures of MUS to be essential to causation rather than as
problematic limit-cases.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
TEE was the lead author and RLA led the project. All authors contributed
equally to the drafting and re-drafting of the paper, as well as development
of ideas and concepts on which the paper is based. The authors'
contributions are related to their respective areas of current research and
expertise. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
TEE, Cand. Polit is a Special Consultant and Social Scientist at the Department of
Work and Environmental Medicine University Hospital of North Norway, Tromsø,
Norway and works on medically unexplained symptoms and phenomenology.
RK, MSc FMACP MCSP is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Medicine and
Health Sciences, University of Nottingham, and works in collaboration with
the University’s Department of Philosophy on the nature of causation in
health research and evidence-based medicine.
SANL, PhD is Associate Professor, at Department of Philosophy, University of
Tromsø, Norway and works on phenomenology and dispositions.
SM, PhD is Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of
Nottingham, Nottingham, UK and Visiting Professor at the Department of
Economics and Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences, Ăs, Norway.
RLA, Dr. Art is research fellow at the Department of Economics and Resource
Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway. SM and
RLA work on metaphysics, dispositions and causation.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge Johan Arnt Myrstad and Anders Lindseth
who helped with the initial development of ideas and thought related to
the paper. The work was carried out with support from the Causation in
Science (CauSci) Project funded by the Research Council of Norway.
Author details
1The Department of Work and Environmental Medicine, University Hospital
of North Norway, Tromsø, Norway. 2Division of Physiotherapy Education,
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. 3Department of Philosophy, University
of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. 4UMB School of Economics and Business,
Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Aas, Norway. 5Department of Philosophy,
University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway.
Received: 11 January 2013 Accepted: 2 September 2013
Published: 4 September 2013
References
1. Hellhammer DH, Hellhammer J (Eds): Stress: The Brain-Body Connection.
Basel, Switzerland: Karger; 2008.
2. Chitnis A, Dowrick C, Byng R, Turner PDS: Guidance for health
professionals on medically unexplained symptoms. In Guidance for health
professionals on medically unexplained symptoms. London: RCGP; 2011.
3. Sears EM: The medical perspective on Environmental Sensitivities. A
report from the Canadian Human Rights Commission. In Book The
medical perspective on Environmental Sensitivities. Ottawa, Canada: Canadian
Human Rights Commission; 2007.
4. Steinbrecher N, Koerber S, Frieser D, Hiller W: The prevalence of medically
unexplained symptoms in primary care. Psychosomatics 2011, 52:263–271.
Eriksen et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2013, 8:11 Page 10 of 11
http://www.peh-med.com/content/8/1/11
5. Deary V: Explaining the unexplained? Overcoming the distortions of a
dualist understanding of medically unexplained illness. J Ment Health
2005, 14:213–221.
6. Ulvestad E: Chronic fatigue syndrome defies the mind-body-schism of
medicine: New perspectives on a multiple realisable developmental
systems disorder. Med, Health Care and Philoso 2008, 11:285–292.
7. Soler JK, Okkes I: Reasons for encounter and symptom diagnoses: a
superior description of patients’ problems in contrast to medically
unexplained symptoms (MUS). Fam Pract 2012, 29:272–282.
8. Vandvik P: Når tarmen slår seg vrang. Tidsskrift for den Norske Legeforening
2009, 129:661.
9. Yannus MB: Central sensitivity syndromes: a new paradigm and group
nosology for fibromyalgia and overlapping conditions, and the related
issue of disease versus illness. Semin Arthritis Rheum 2008, 37:339–352.
10. Voigt K, Nagel A, Meyer B, Langs G, Braukhaus C, Lowe B: Towards positive
diagnostic criteria: A systematic review of somatoform disorder
diagnoses and suggestions for future classification. J Psychosom Res 2010,
68:403–414.
11. Risor MB: Illness explanations among patients with medically
unexplained symptoms - different idioms for different contexts.
Health 2009, 13:505–521.
12. Hiller W, Cebulla M, Korn H-J, Leibbrand R, Röers B, Nilges N: Causal
symptoms attributions in somatoform disorder and chronic pain.
J Psychosom Res 2010, 68:9–19.
13. Airaksinen O, Brox JI, Cedraschi C: Chapter 4. European guidelines for the
management of chronic nonspecific low back pain. Eur Spine J 2006,
15(suppl 2):S192–S300.
14. Balagué F, Mannion AF, Pellisé F, Cedraschi C: Non-specific low back pain.
Lancet 2012, 379:482–491.
15. Roffey DM, Wai EK, Bishop P, Kwon BK, Dagenais S: Causal assessment of
occupational sitting and low back pain: results of a systematic review.
Spine J 2010, 10:252–261.
16. Roffey DM, Wai EK, Bishop P, Kwon BK, Dagenais S: Causal assessment of
awkward occupational postures and low back pain: results of a
systematic review. Spine J 2010, 10:89–99.
17. Roffey DM, Wai EK, Bishop P, Kwon BK, Dagenais S: Causal assessment of
occupational standing or walking and low back pain: results of a
systematic review. Spine J 2010, 10:262–272.
18. Wai EK, Roffey DM, Bishop P, Kwon BK, Dagenais S: Causal assessment of
occupational bending or twisting and low back pain: results of a
systematic review. Spine J 2010, 10:76–88.
19. Wai EK, Roffey DM, Bishop P, Kwon BK, Dagenais S: Causal assessment of
occupational lifting and low back pain: results of a systematic review.
Spine J 2010, 10:554–566.
20. Wai EK, Roffey DM, Bishop P, Kwon BK, Dagenais S: Causal assessment of
occupational carrying and low back pain: results of a systematic review.
Spine J 2010, 10:628–638.
21. Shiri R, Karppinen J, Leino-Arjas P, Solovieva S, Viikari-Juntura E: The
association between obesity and low back pain: a meta-analysis.
Am J Epidemiol 2010, 171:135–154.
22. Verbunt J, Smeets RJ, Wittink HM: Cause or effect? Deconditioning and
chronic low back pain. Pain 2010, 149:428–430.
23. Battie MC, Videman T, Levalahti E, Gill K, Kaprio J: Heritability of low back
pain and the role of disc degeneration. Pain 2007, 131:272–280.
24. Kalichman L, Hunter DJ: The genetics of intervertebral disc degeneration.
Associated genes. Joint Bone Spine 2008, 75:388–396.
25. Kalichman L, Hunter DJ: The genetics of intervertebral disc degeneration.
Familial predisposition and heritability estimation. Joint Bone Spine 2008,
75:383–387.
26. Karppinen J, Solovieva S, Luoma K, Raininko R, Leino-Arjas P, Riihimaki H:
Modic changes and interleukin 1 gene locus polymorphisms in
occupational cohort of middle-aged men. Eur Spine J 2009, 18:1963–1970.
27. Dai F, Belfer I, Schwartz CE: Association of catechol-O-methyltransferase
genetic variants with outcome in patients undergoing surgical
treatment for lumbar degenerative disc disease. Spine J 2010, 10:949–957.
28. Tegeder I, Lotsch J: Current evidence for a modulation of low back pain
by human genetic variants. J Cell Mol Med 2009, 13:1605–1619.
29. Riemann F, Cox JJ, Belfer I: Pain perception is altered by a nucleotide
polymorphism in SCN9A. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2010, 107:5148–5153.
30. Shiri R, Karppinen J, Leino-Arjas P, Solovieva S, Viikari-Juntura E: The
association between smoking and low back pain: a meta-analysis.
Am J Med 2010, 123:87 e87-35.
31. Cheung KM, Karppinen J, Chan D: Prevalence and pattern of lumbar
magnetic resonance imaging changes in a population study of one
thousand forty-three individuals. Spine 2009, 34:934–940.
32. de Schepper EI, Damen J, van Meurs JB: The association between lumbar
disc degeneration and low back pain: the influence of age, gender, and
individual radiographic features. Spine 2010, 35:531–536.
33. Endean A, Palmer KT, Coggon D: Potential of magnetic resonance
imaging findings to refine case definition for mechanical low back pain
in epidemiological studies: a systematic review. Spine 2011, 36:160–169.
34. Wang H, Schiltenwolf M, Buchner M: The role of TNF-alpha in patients
with chronic low back pain-a prospective comparative longitudinal
study. Clin J Pain 2008, 24:273–278.
35. Yamauchi K, Inoue G, Koschi T: Nerve growth factor of cultured medium
extracted from human degenerative nucleus pulposus promotes sensory
nerve growth and induces substance p in vitro. Spine 2009, 34:2263–2269.
36. Kent P, Keathing J: Do primary-care clinicians think that nonspecific low
back pain is one condition? Spine 2004, 29:1022–1031.
37. Jeffrey JE, Foster NE: A qualitative investigation of physical therapists’
experiences and feelings of managing patients with nonspecific low
back pain. Phys Ther 2012, 92:266–278.
38. Engel GL: The need for a new medical model: a challenge for
biomedicine. Science 1977, 196:129–136.
39. Alvarez AS, Pagani M, Meucci P: The clinical application of the
Biopsychosocial model in mental health. Am J Phys Med Rehab 2012,
91(suppl):S173–S180.
40. Butler CC, Evans M, Greaves D, Simpson S: Medically unexplained
symptoms: the biopsychosocial model found wanting. JR Soc Med 2004,
97:219–222.
41. Eriksen TE, Kirkengen AL, Vetlesen AJ: The medically unexplained revisited.
Med Health Care Philos 2012, 16:587–600.
42. Musalek M, Schebenbogen O: From categorical to dimensional
diagnostics: deficiency-oriented versus person-centered diagnostics.
Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 2008, 258:18–21.
43. Jaspers JPC: Lumpers vs splitters. J Psychosom Obstet Gyneacol 2003,
24:213–214.
44. Fink P, Schroder A: One single diagnosis, bodily distress syndrome,
succeeded to capture 10 diagnostic categories of functional somatic
syndromes and somatoform disorders. J Psychosom Res 2010, 68:415–426.
45. Ursin H, Eriksen HR: Cognitive activation theory of stress (CATS).
Neurosci Biobehavioural Res 2010, 34:877–881.
46. Byrne P: Functional somatic syndromes. Br J Hosp Med 2011, 72:604–605.
47. Thomas LE: Are your patient’s medically symptoms really “all in her
head”? Med Hypotheses 2012, 78:542–547.
48. Malterud K: Kroniske muskelsmerter kan forklares på mange måter.
Tidsskrift for den Norske Legeforening 2010, 130:2356–2359.
49. Bibeau G: What is Human in Humans? Responses from Biology,
Anthropology, and philosophy. J Med Philos 2011, 36:354–363.
50. Kerry R, Eriksen TE, Lie SAN, Mumford SD, Anjum RL: Causation and
evidence-based practice: An ontological review. J Eval Clin Pract 2012,
18:1006–1012.
51. Mumford SD, Anjum RL: Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford University Press; 2011.
52. Harré R, Madden EH: Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity. Oxford:
Blackwell; 1975.
53. Mumford SD: Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998.
54. Mumford SD (Ed): Molnar G. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2003.
55. Bird A: Nature’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007.
56. Mumford SD: Laws in Nature. Abingdon: Routledge; 2004.
doi:10.1186/1747-5341-8-11
Cite this article as: Eriksen et al.: At the borders of medical reasoning:
aetiological and ontological challenges of medically unexplained
symptoms. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2013 8:11.
Eriksen et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2013, 8:11 Page 11 of 11
http://www.peh-med.com/content/8/1/11
